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ALGORITHMIC CENTRAL PLANNING: 






In 1945, when the Soviet Union was emerging victorious from the Second 
World War, and communism and planned economies would soon become the 
reality for millions of people in Eastern Europe, F. A. Hayek wrote his seminal 
The Use of Knowledge in Society, which began: 
What is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational economic 
order? 
On certain familiar assumptions the answer is simple enough. If we possess all the 
relevant information, if we can start out from a given system of preferences, and if we 
command complete knowledge of available means, the problem which remains is purely 
one of logic. . . . 
This, however, is emphatically not the economic problem which society faces. . . . The 
reason for this is that the “data” from which the economic calculus starts are never for 
the whole society “given” to a single mind which could work out the implications, and 
can never be so given.1 
I contest F. A. Hayek’s assertion that the conditions for an efficient planned 
economy can never materialize. On the contrary, I argue that the validity of his 
claim is contingent upon the state of technology in a given society and the types 
of socio-technological practices that people engage in. Advances in data 
processing technologies might render an economic order based on central 
planning possible to realize and potentially more efficient than a market 
economy relying on private property and contract exchange. In this Article, I 
analyze the theoretical preconditions of an efficient centrally planned economy 
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and demonstrate that the theory and practice of contemporary information 
technology suggest that we might soon be able to meet them. As a result, the 
argument goes, economic planning—as opposed to a market paradigm—might 
be worth putting back on the table by progressive economists. 
Consequently, we might soon face a choice between efficiency, welfare, and 
convenience on the one hand, and freedom and autonomy on the other. In other 
words, we will need to confront the question: do we prefer the liberal world of 
contract, property, and market exchange over a world of command and control 
because we believe it is more efficient, or because we think it is morally superior? 
As of today, “both” is a perfectly good answer. It just so happens that societies 
that embraced the market paradigm, particularly a highly regulated market with 
significant wealth redistribution, simultaneously enjoy higher levels of welfare 
and higher levels of individual autonomy.2 When, however, planning becomes 
more efficient (or, put differently, less inefficient) than markets, we will have to 
choose. A Chicago-style economic analysis of law that asks “what are the efficient 
rules of property and contract?” might soon lead us to answer: “none 
whatsoever.”  
If we do not confront this question, and continue to insist that individual 
freedom and economic efficiency necessarily go hand in hand, we may move from 
a market economy to an algorithmically planned economy without making a 
conscious decision to do so. Not overnight, maybe not even within one 
generation, but tacitly, step-by-step, the transition will occur. Almost by accident, 
one could say. Putting forth a general claim about human “nature,”3 I hypothesize 
that a sufficiently large number of individuals could happily give up some 
freedom in exchange for more welfare and more convenience. In this sense, 
planning will lead us to some form of authoritarianism, where an entity external 
to the individual will be telling her what to do and what to consume. However, 
unlike with the twentieth century’s socialist states, authoritarianism will emerge 
not because the planning will fail, but because it will succeed in delivering more 
efficient outcomes than markets. Individuals will not be stripped of political and 
economic freedom; they will voluntarily give it up.4  
Before analyzing the normative questions posed by an algorithmically 
planned economy, I use Part II to outline the history of the idea and practice of 
central planning and articulate the conceptual differences between a heavily 
 
 2.  We might, and probably should, be unhappy about dozens of social, economic, and political 
conditions in the United States and the European Union; but we still prefer those societies over what is 
happening in Cuba, China, or North Korea.   
 3.  I take “nature” to mean “the way humans happen to be,” without making strong claims on 
whether those conditions and qualities are necessary in some metaphysical sense, or contingent on 
“nurture” but so pervasive that they cannot be ignored. 
 4.  This is not, by any means, the only possible future. I am not sure if this is even the most likely 
future. Arguably, this is a possible future which is morally superior to many other alternatives: in the end, 
if we cannot be free, we might at least implement an economic system that satisfies our basic needs. 
Nevertheless, philosophically speaking, this is the most interesting possible future to consider, because it 
puts new normative questions on the table. 
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regulated market economy and a centrally planned economy. Part III then 
describes the historical objections to a centrally planned economy and explains 
how technological advances might allow its proponents to overcome their critics’ 
longstanding objections. Part IV is a thought experiment: I describe a 
hypothetical day in an algorithmically planned life. I use this hypothetical to 
discuss how we might have to normatively decide whether freedom from want is 
preferable to the freedom of economic choice or vice versa. In Part V, I consider 
the role of law in facilitating this change of socioeconomic systems. Ultimately, I 
conclude that the shift to a centrally planned economy will occur only if the law 
allows it to do so, but law alone is insufficient to prevent the change. By “allows” 
I do not mean “not prohibiting” in some public sense, but rather creating 
institutional frameworks that incentivize socio-technological moves in the 
direction of central planning. The current legal foundations of the market 
economy, including almost unlimited freedom to use personal information and 
directly market goods and services in micro-targeted way, paired with the value 
of efficiency as the guiding principle for many private lawyers, has set us on a 
path that might soon render contract and property law obsolete. And, if we 
believe these changes are normatively undesirable, we should react by putting 
certain legal constraints in place, or by changing the incentives. More profoundly, 
however, we should engage in broader cultural and philosophical debates about 
the relationship between efficiency and convenience on the one hand, and 
freedom or autonomy on the other. 
Before putting forward the arguments for these claims, let me clarify some 
concepts I have been, until now, using quite loosely. And let me do so by looking 
at the history of the idea of the centrally planned economy. 
 
II 
THE IDEA AND THE HISTORY OF LIVING IT 
A. An Alien Paradigm 
The twentieth century witnessed a heated debate between proponents and 
opponents of the idea of a centrally planned economy. This idea was considered 
a viable alternative to a market-based economy by many intellectuals, including 
those openly calling themselves socialists,5 as well as the critics of the 
“naturalistic” approach to the market.6 The socialist critique of the market 
economy could be, roughly, equated with socialism’s critique of capitalism: a 
system that alienates workers from their labor and promotes the exploitation of 
 
 5.  See Oskar Lange, The Computer and the Market, in SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 158 (C.H. Feinstein ed., 1967) [hereinafter The Computer and the Market]; Oskar Lange, On 
the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part One, 4 REV. ECON. STUD. 53, 66–68 (1936) [hereinafter 
Economic Theory of Socialism].  
 6.  See, e.g., KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). 
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masses by the owners of the capital is socially undesirable.7 Therefore, it should 
be replaced by a more equitable economic order. 
What would a planned economic order look like? In a socialist, centrally 
planned economy, private ownership of means of production would be abolished, 
alongside the institution of money.8 Instead of producing “for-profit,” the state 
would manage overall production “for-use.” A central planner would decide 
what should be produced and by whom, in what quantity, and how to distribute 
it. Individuals, instead of competing with one another and acting upon their 
greed, would work together towards a common goal, and be appropriately 
rewarded upon the plan’s completion. 
Another objection to the market-based economy, and a non-socialist voice 
supporting planning, was offered by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation.9 
Polanyi argued that, contrary to common belief, markets are not natural and have 
in fact been artificially constructed through the state’s legal action by the creation 
of “fictitious commodities”: land, labor, and money.10 Polanyi supported this view 
with historical and ethnographic evidence, effectively claiming that living in a 
market society runs against human nature.11 According to this view, planning 
does not need to be “central” for the whole nation-state. Smaller communities 
can plan their economies and trade only with one another outside of the day-to-
day production and consumption by the people. 
The socialist and anthropological critique of a liberal market economy was 
based on an accurate diagnosis of the problems caused by laissez-faire capitalism 
and rapid industrialization of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
exploitation of workers, poor working and living conditions of the masses, as well 
as the feeling of social inadequacy of farmers turned into factory workers 
overnight, were real challenges.12 These problems prompted reactions on the 
intellectual level, most notably that of Marx13 and Engels,14 the societal level, 
through labor movements and several political revolutions, and the political-legal 
level, with the social turn.15 However, the responses to these challenges could 
 
 7.  See generally LESZEK KOŁAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM: THE FOUNDERS, THE 
GOLDEN AGE, THE BREAKDOWN 230–43 (P. S. Falla trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 2005) (1978).  
 8.  The abolition of money was not always articulated directly by the socialist economists, but seems 
to be presupposed in their writing. Moreover, the critics of the idea of central planning were directly 
attacking this point. For an example of such criticism, see LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 113–22 (J. Kahane trans., 1951).  
 9.  See generally POLANYI, supra note 6. 
 10.  See id. at 71–81.  
 11.  See id. at 136–40.  
 12.  See, e.g., Carol Boyd Leon, The Life of American Workers in 1915, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Feb. 
2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/the-life-of-american-workers-in-1915.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/N98U-S2NX]. 
 13.  See generally KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Frederick Engels 
ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Charles H. Kerr & Co. 1906) (1867).  
 14.  See generally FRIEDRICH ENGELS, SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC (Edward Aveling 
trans., Charles H. Kerr & Co. 1918) (1880).  
 15.  See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW 
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).  
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have taken shape either by rejecting the market-based economy and instead 
embracing central planning, or by regulating the market, which still would remain 
the core of the economic order. 
In the West, the second strand prevailed. In Europe, social democracy, largely 
influenced by the ordoliberal thinkers of the Freiburg school,16 and Christian 
democracy, influenced by the Catholic social teaching of the popes rejecting both 
unchecked liberalism and communism,17 ended up being the intellectual and 
political underpinning of the post-World War II welfare states. In the United 
States, this role was played by the ideology of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New 
Deal; a progressive assault on laissez-faire economic policy and an attempt to 
save capitalism by partially taming its excesses.18 Governments in the West 
accepted the market as a necessary, often naturally occurring, mode of allocating 
resources and began treating private property and freedom of contract as obvious 
institutions. Any corrections to the distribution of resources resulting from this 
spontaneous order—even significant ones in the form of social security benefits, 
public healthcare, pensions, or other public services—would be exceptions or 
additions to the rule of the market. The debates between proponents of state 
intervention and laissez-faire—that is the debates that we currently see between 
“the left” and “the right”—took place within this paradigm, according to which 
market exchange is natural and necessary. 
In the meantime, east of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union and its satellites 
embraced central planning. The Central Planning Board of the Communist Party 
would issue a plan (usually every five years) which specified the quantity of 
production in various sectors of the national economy, from mining to 
manufacturing to infrastructure construction to agriculture. Then, publicly-
owned enterprises were charged with realizing that plan, and workers—who were 
under an obligation to have an occupation, and who needed the state’s 
permission to change occupation—were encouraged to meet, or even exceed, the 
production norms. Labor stopped being a commodity traded on the market; 
freedom to start one’s own enterprise was abolished, and the ownership of the 
vast majority of means of production was concentrated in the quite visible hand 
of the state. Even in these centrally planned economies, the states retained 
money as both a store of value and a medium of exchange, did not abolish private 
ownership of chattel, and to a small extent tolerated private ownership of land. 
However, the ability to acquire goods was not fully determined by the money an 
individual possessed, but rather by the authoritative allocation of goods in certain 
 
 16.  See generally Ralf Ptak, Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of 
the Social Market Economy, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL 
THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 98 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009).  
 17.  See MACIEJ ZIEBA, PAPAL ECONOMICS: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ON DEMOCRATIC 
CAPITALISM, FROM RERUM NEVARUM TO CARITAS IN VERITATE 97–100, 118–21 (2013).  
 18.  See HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW DEAL 12 (1970). For 
a historical account situating the New Deal within a larger global context, see generally KIRAN KLAUS 
PATEL, THE NEW DEAL: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2016).  
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areas, as reflected in quotas and official coupons. No large-scale private 
ownership of the means of production, like land or securities, ever emerged.19 
This approach was therefore not a correction of liberalism, but a fundamental 
rejection of the market. In other words, market elements such as private 
ownership and contracting were corrections of planning, not the other way 
around. The socialist countries of Eastern Europe embraced a different paradigm 
of economic order—an economy based on a political plan—that is so alien to us 
nowadays. 
B. Regulation and Redistribution versus Planned Economy 
A terminological clarification might be in order now. There is a significant 
difference between state intervention in the market and state abolition of the 
market.20 It is possible to have a heavily regulated, heavily taxed economic order, 
where large-scale redistribution takes place and numerous social services are 
provided, that is still a liberal market economy. This paradigm is not a planned 
economy. 
A planned economy is an economy where activities of individuals result not 
from their decision to engage in them, but directly from the command of a 
legitimate entity, such as the government. In such a system, individuals engaging 
in production and consumption do so in response to legitimate normative orders 
or instructions. Regulation, within the market paradigm, sets the rules of the 
game for choosing and bargaining. Redistribution, within the market paradigm, 
equalizes the opportunities available to players, or corrects the outcomes of the 
game. Planning gets rid of the game entirely. 
Another way to explain the difference is to refer to Ronald Coase’s 
distinction between markets and hierarchies.21 In The Nature of the Firm, Coase 
theorized two types of economic organization: the price mechanism, and direct 
control of a superior over the worker.22 His question was: what explains the 
choice to create firms as opposed to doing everything through markets, or 
outsourcing certain activities from a firm to the market?23 His Nobel-Prize-
winning answer was simple: transaction costs.24 If it is cheaper and more efficient 
to plan, we create a firm. If it is cheaper to contract, we deploy markets. 
A worker within a firm, instructed by a manager to do something, does not 
bargain with her—he follows. Different divisions of the same firm do not 
 
 19.  Stock exchanges literally did not exist, and there was no legal or economic tool for acquiring 
shares in any economic entities.  
 20.  See F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, READER’S DIG., 45–46 (Apr. 1945) (“It is important not 
to confuse opposition against . . . planning with a dogmatic laissez faire attitude . . . . The successful use 
of competition does not preclude some types of government interference. For instance, to limit working 
hours, to require certain sanitary arrangements, to provide an extensive system of social services is fully 
compatible with the preservation of competition.”).  
 21.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 22.  Id. at 388.  
 23.  See id.  
 24.  Id. at 390. 
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compete against one another—they cooperate. Conceptually then, a planned 
economy would be just one, enormous firm, where everyone does what the 
manager of the economy tells them to do. 
One might contest these distinctions and point to the fact that for many 
individuals, past and present, the freedom of choice is illusory. One could argue 
that many contracts are actually coerced—imposed upon people by social 
realities. That a worker accepting a low paid, dehumanizing job in an Amazon 
warehouse does not freely accept it. She may be forced to accept it by the need 
to provide for her family, equally unattractive offers on the job market, or the 
unfair education system that rendered her less educated than others. All of these 
objections carry some truth.25 
There is a difference, however, between a system that endows an individual 
with normative freedom to choose her life path without providing the means 
necessary to exercise that freedom, and a system questioning the very idea that 
individuals decide their own life paths. The first one is an unfair liberal order. 
The second is planning.26 
C. The Critiques and the Defenses of a Planned Economy 
Not many criticized the socialists for identifying that the market economy 
risked creating and exacerbating inequality and exploitation. Likewise, few 
criticized the socialists’ ideals: prosperity and non-dominance by the capital 
owners. Criticism has been directed instead towards the means of achieving that 
goal. Central planning, in particular, has received two lines of criticism: 
deontological, that is, invoking human dignity and liberty; and consequentialist, 
that is, concentrating on efficiency and the chance of realizing it. Hayek, in fact, 
accounted for both: 
Liberalism . . . regards competition as superior [to planning] not only because in most 
circumstances it is the most efficient method known but because it is the only method 
which does not require the coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority. It dispenses 
with the need for ‘conscious social control’ and gives individuals a chance to decide 
whether the prospects of a particular occupation are sufficient to compensate for the 
disadvantages connected with it.27 
In other words, there are two reasons to prefer a market economy over a 
planned economy: it is morally superior on account of respecting individual 
 
 25.  This realization led the Legal Realists to criticize the very distinction between private and public 
law. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 482 (1988). This realization 
also led later generations of post-realist thinkers, most notably the Critical Legal Theory scholars, to 
assert that the formal equality of persons in contract and tort is just a masking device for structural 
inequalities, power relations, and hierarchies of subjugation, both created and sustained by the law. See 
id. at 532–40.  
 26.  Unless one subscribes to a hard version of historical materialism, ideas matter at least in some 
way and to some degree. Authoritatively stated ideas, enshrined by the law, matter in profound ways. 
And so the world in which a signal “your life is for you to shape” is sent, even if the material conditions 
do not allow it, is a very different world from the one where a signal “it is up to the planner to decide 
how to shape your life” is the organizing message.  
 27.  See Hayek, supra note 20, at 45–46 (emphasis added).  
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autonomy and freedom, and it is more efficient, creating a bigger pie and 
distributing it more fairly.28 For Hayek, it seemed incontestable that both hold at 
the same time. Let us take a closer look at each. 
A deontological critique of planning would concentrate on the fact that 
property is a natural right of every individual29 and depriving her of the private 
possession of goods and land runs against the fundamental rights of persons.30 
Similarly, freedom to choose one’s occupation, freedom to contract about one’s 
time and possessions, and freedom to choose one’s way of life, are incompatible 
with the idea of central planning.31 Once the planner steps in—the critique would 
go—individuals are stripped not only of property, but also of choices regarding 
their preferences about small and large issues in their lives. 
A consequentialist critique, on the other hand, would underline the negative 
consequences of attempting to build a centrally planned economy. The common 
conviction here has been that the endeavor would be impossible to realize, would 
be inefficient, and would lead to disastrous effects, including mass poverty and 
social frustration. The most familiar argument for that claim was offered by 
Hayek in The Road to Serfdom.32 Read together with The Use of Knowledge in 
Society,33 this critique could be summarized as follows: efficient planning is 
impossible because it presupposes full knowledge about the availability of goods 
and means of production, as well as individual preferences. This knowledge is 
local, distributed in the minds of individuals themselves, often incomplete, 
constantly changing, and as a result, impossible to aggregate. 
Since planning would fail—the argument continues—impoverished and 
frustrated individuals would start questioning the system. The system, if it wished 
to preserve power, would need to silence these voices and keep social unrest in 
check, inevitably leading to some form of authoritarianism. Hence, the 
deontological and consequentialist critiques come together. 
Others highlight that even if central planners could successfully aggregate all 
necessary data, the algorithm for state-wide distribution would be extremely 
 
 28.  Which, if efficiency is our meta-normative value, would be also morally superior. Similarly, if we 
assume that individuals derive value from being autonomous, the former could be treated as 
economically efficient. The distinction I want to retain is that between deontological value of autonomy 
(regardless of the economic outcome) and consequentialist value of efficiency (regardless of its potential 
moral value). For yet another normative take, going beyond the deontological and consequentialist 
dichotomy and proposing a teleological justification for property as advancing individual autonomy, see 
HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (forthcoming 2020).  
 29.  See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett 1980) (1690).  
 30.  See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (“Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others.”).  
 31.  See Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum: Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor (1891), 
http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-
novarum.html [https://perma.cc/8R26-XKKD]. 
 32.  See Hayek, supra note 20, at 49–51.  
 33.  See Hayek, supra note 1, at 524–26.  
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complicated.34 Further, even if we could have such an algorithm, we would not 
have workforce sufficient to compute it.35 Finally, even if we did, the question of 
how to get from these results on paper to the actual social ordering remains 
unanswered.36 As a result, the critique goes, planning is less efficient than markets 
at best, and impossible to realize at worst.37 
These criticisms resulted in theoretical responses from socialist economists. 
Most famously, Lange proposed to use computers to fulfill these tasks.38 In his 
view, the problem was not theoretical but practical—the task might be hard, but 
not impossible.39 Eventually, technological progress would render theoretical 
possibilities a reality.40 Lange acknowledged the moral value of markets in 
determining how goods and wealth should be distributed. However, since the 
operation of markets comes with social and individual costs, he believed that we 
do not really need to live in the market and suffer all the negative consequences—
we can just simulate them.41 In 1936, he suggested the trial and error approach to 
different ways of conducting central planning,42 and thirty years later he argued 
that, thanks to computing technology, we might receive the benefits of markets 
without bearing the costs. He wrote: 
The market mechanism and trial and error procedure proposed in my essay really 
played the role of a computing device for solving a system of simultaneous equations.  
. . . Such an electronic analogue . . . simulates the working of the market. This statement, 
however, may be reversed: the market simulates the electronic analogue computer. In 
other words, the market may be considered as a computer sui generis which serves to 
solve a system of simultaneous equations. . . . The market may be considered as one of 
the oldest historical devices for solving simultaneous equations.43 
Note that, to Lange, individual preferences and choices did matter. There is 
value in letting people do what they want and rewarding them with what they 
enjoy for their labor. However, as is clear to us and was clear to Lange, only very 
few individuals actually enjoy significant freedom in choosing: individuals are 
limited by resource scarcity, market inefficiency, and inherent market unfairness. 
Knowing what resources are available, and what individuals’ preferences are, 
might allow us—through trial and error—to simulate the market. We could then 
 
 34.  See Joseph Salerno, Postscript: Why a Socialist Economy is “Impossible”, in LUDWIG VON 
MISES, ECONOMIC CALCULATION IN THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH 51 (S. Adler trans., 1990).  
 35.  Id. at 52–53.   
 36.  See, e.g., LEIGH PHILLIPS & MICHAL ROZWORSKI, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF WALMART: 
HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST CORPORATIONS ARE LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR SOCIALISM 76–99 
(2019). 
 37.  See Salerno, supra note 34, at 49 (“Ludwig von Mises demonstrates . . . that, under socialist 
central planning, there are no means of economic calculation and that, therefore, socialist economy itself 
is ‘impossible’ . . . not just inefficient or less innovative or conducted without benefit of decentralized 
knowledge, but really and truly and literally impossible.”). 
 38.  See The Computer and the Market, supra note 5, at 158. 
 39.  Id.   
 40.  Id. at 159.   
 41.  Id. at 160.   
 42.  See Economic Theory of Socialism, supra note 5, at 66. 
 43.  The Computer and the Market, supra note 5, at 158–59. 
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arrive at a more efficient allocation than the market itself, respecting individual 
preferences to a no lesser degree. Computers would make this possible. 
That was the theory. 
D.  Capitalism Wins, but Things do not Unfold According to the Plan 
The debates between market economy supporters and planned economy 
proponents were not resolved by scholarly philosophical or economic theorizing, 
but rather by history itself. The market paradigm prevailed. Both those 
advocating for liberty and those praising efficiency could proclaim themselves 
victors. 
All the attempts to construct centrally planned economies failed. The Soviet 
Union and the “Second World” of the Eastern bloc bled out. Inefficiency, 
poverty, and authoritarianism followed all the communist attempts to replace the 
markets with planning, from Havana to Pyongyang.44 At the same time, Western 
capitalist societies thrived. Not without problems, definitely imperfect, but 
superior to planned economies regarding wealth, efficiency, creativity, and 
freedom. As the Eastern bloc crumbled, liberal, capitalist democracy seemed like 
the best way to go. Welfare states looked like a solution to the problem of social 
costs of markets. Clearly, there were political decisions to be made regarding the 
amount of taxation and redistribution. But the paradigm of the market as a tool 
for organizing the economy, even a highly regulated one, seemed uncontestable. 
Fukuyama published the (in)famous The End of History?45 Hayek looked like a 
prophet: the largest economic experiment ever conducted proved his theory was 
right. 
A rapid westernization of the Second World followed—a transition to 
capitalism and a market economy, and the construction of the institutions 
necessary for the market’s operation. From Tallinn to Tirana one could see the 
emergence of central banks, stock exchanges, privatization of public property and 
companies, and liberalization of the laws governing the economy. On the global 
level, the world of the 1990s became smaller, the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade morphed into the World Trade Organization,46 trade thrived, Ricardo 
smiled in his grave,47 automation continued. Quite rapidly, economic thinking 
 
 44.  See, e.g., Matthias Middell, 1989, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF 
COMMUNISM  171 (Stephen A. Smith ed., 2014); Ilya Somin, Lessons from a Century of Communism, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/11/07/ 
lessons-from-a-century-of-communism/ [https://perma.cc/5DYL-R37G]. 
 45.  See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 NAT’L INT. 3, 4 (1989) (arguing that the end of 
the Cold War marked the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of 
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”).  
 46.  See generally S. P. Shukla, From GATT to WTO and Beyond (United Nations Univ. World Inst. 
for Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 195, 2000), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/ 
default/files/wp195.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NDL-RUP6]. 
 47.  See Arnaud Costinot & Dave Donaldson, Ricardo’s Theory of Comparative Advantage: Old 
Idea, New Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17969, 2012), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w17969.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3Y6-MXV6] (finding that David Ricardo’s 
nineteenth century theory of competitive advantage, which provides a strong argument in favor of free 
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converged: one no longer found books on “economics of capitalism” and 
“economics of socialism,” but simply “economics.” Young economists in the 
twenty-first century often do not even read Hayek. The field has completely 
internalized the core of his theory. The debates we have, even the heated ones, 
all take place within the market economy paradigm. 
Nevertheless, in 2020, few share the optimism about the inevitable progress 
of the economy and political freedom that prevailed thirty years ago. In the West, 
social inequalities are on the rise,48 the glass ceiling seems thick,49 and the amount 
of low-paid jobs is not shrinking, unlike the middle class.50 On the political level, 
reasons for optimism do not abound, either. “Authoritarianism” is a strong word, 
but we hear it often uttered in and about Trump’s United States, as well as 
Turkey, Hungary, Poland, and Brazil, and of course Russia.51 The United 
Kingdom struggles to leave the European Union.52 China serves as proof that 
political freedom does not necessarily follow economic freedom.53 Amidst 
weather anomalies caused by climate change and global warming, we try to 
understand the changes around us, and we desperately try to think of a way of 
stopping, if not reversing them. 
At the same time, we witness significant technological innovations.54 The 
proliferation of personal computers and smart devices connected via wireless 
networks has led to countless online services. Communication, shopping, 
banking, dating, reading news, and many other mundane activities are now 
mediated by technology. The line between being online and offline is getting 
blurrier.55 All this triggers changes in social life and simultaneously documents 
them. 
 
trade, “is not just mathematically correct and non-trivial; it also has significant explanatory power in the 
data” on actual output levels).  
 48.  See generally UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD SOCIAL REPORT 
2020: INEQUALITY IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD (2020),  https://www.un.org/development/ 
desa/dspd/world-social-report/2020-2.html [https://perma.cc/ZME3-DQ77]. 
 49.  See DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: HOW AMERICA’S FOUNDATIONAL 
MYTH FEEDS INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS, AND DEVOURS THE ELITE 197–232 
(2019). 
 50.  See id.  
 51.  See Ivan Krastev, Eastern Europe’s Illiberal Revolution: The Long Road to Democratic Decline, 
FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2018, at 39, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2018-04-
16/eastern-europes-illiberal-revolution [https://perma.cc/7CZ4-7HT4]. See generally CAN IT HAPPEN 
HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018).  
 52.  See Benjamin Mueller, What is Brexit? And What Happens Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/europe/what-is-brexit.html [https://perma.cc/TL4D-
KVBY]. 
 53.  See Mark P. Lagon, Prosperity Without Democracy? Demystifying the China Model, FREEDOM 
HOUSE (July 28, 2015), https://freedomhouse.org/article/prosperity-without-democracy-demystifying-
china-model [https://perma.cc/EBK3-8WN9] (“For more than three decades, the Chinese Communist 
Party has overseen impressive economic growth and lifted millions out of poverty, while keeping a tight 
lid on civil society, political freedom, and dissent.”). 
 54.  The word “progress” seems too normatively loaded. 
 55.  See generally Mireille Hildebrandt, Dualism is Dead. Long Live Plurality (Instead of Duality), 
in THE ONLIFE MANIFESTO: BEING HUMAN IN A HYPERCONNECTED ERA (Luciano Floridi ed., 2015). 
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Suddenly, almost everything we do leaves a digital footprint. Every move 
online, and often offline, creates valuable data. The availability of all this data 
triggers developments in machine learning and other data analytics 
technologies.56 These developments allow us to automate certain tasks 
traditionally undertaken by humans (for example, translation or spam detection), 
and in some ways render machines not only much faster, but also more precise, 
in performing human-experts’ jobs (for example, stock trading or cancer 
prediction). These developments cause excitement on the one hand57 and concern 
on the other.58 We ponder regulation of algorithms,59 while the extraterritorially 
applicable regulation of data processing, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GPDR), has entered in force in the European Union. Theoretical concepts turn 
into reality, distinct but interconnected with one another: big data, artificial 
intelligence, Internet of Things, ubiquitous computing, platform and sharing 
economy—you name it—attract scholarly and public attention. Responses range 
from policy recommendations and actual regulation, to attempts to understand 
these phenomena within commonly shared economic and legal paradigms. 
It is worthwhile to reconsider the possibility of realizing the idea of central 
planning in the light of these socio-technological changes. I contest Hayek’s claim 
that data necessary for conducting the efficient planning can never be given to a 
computer, or a network of cooperating computers. Hayek’s imagination was 
limited by the then-existing level of technological development. I claim that 
central planning might be practically feasible, and more efficient than markets, 
in the decades to come. 
 
III 
THEORETICAL PRECONDITIONS AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
A. How Close Are We? 
Let us re-consider the objections against the feasibility of an efficient planned 
economy: 
1. It is impossible to aggregate the knowledge about available means of 
production and individual preferences; 
2. Even if one did collect this knowledge, we would not have an 
algorithm for the resource allocation; 
3. Even if we had the algorithm, we would not have the power to 
compute it; 
 
 56.  See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI, at 1–54 (2016).  
 57.  See generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE 
ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD (2015). 
 58.  See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA 
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016). 
 59.  See generally Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 354, 393–98 (2016); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for 
Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017). 
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4. Even if we computed it, there would be the problem of turning the 
plan into reality. 
I address them one by one. 
First, the problem of knowledge collection. Let us assume that every 
individual carries a device through which she can communicate—in real-time—
information about her preferences, wants, and available resources. Such a device 
would need to have an interface enabling individuals to do so, and would need to 
be connected to the network aggregating the knowledge from all the devices in 
the economy. Ideally, some of this data collection would occur in the background, 
without requiring individuals to always consciously act. Moreover, such devices 
would need to enable the individuals to provide feedback—rating or reacting to 
various experiences—in order to keep their dynamic and changing preferences 
updated. In 2020, this problem does not exist. A significant majority of the 
American population uses internet-connected smartphones daily,60 relies on 
social media giving them ability to rate almost everything,61 and receives 
personalized commercial and political communications based on revealed 
knowledge and ratings. Moreover, with the advent of ubiquitous computing and 
the so-called Internet of Things, a significant number of household and industrial 
appliances, from cars to fridges to warehouses to electric grids, contain computers 
measuring their performance and communicating with one another without 
direct human commands.62 In 2020, companies like Google, Facebook, and 
Amazon know more about individual preferences than do the individuals 
themselves.63 We can collect and aggregate these data. 
Second, the problem of the allocation-algorithm. All these data, one could 
argue, could be aggregated, but there is no way to understand it; nor to derive 
any prescriptive value from it. The first objection no longer holds. Advances in 
big data analytics technologies, like machine learning, demonstrate that machines 
are extremely efficient at detecting patterns in enormous datasets.64 Advances in 
mathematics allow us to reason with incomplete data and approximations and 
still achieve results superior to those achieved by humans.65 The impossibility of 
deriving prescriptive statements from descriptive data is a greater potential 
problem. However, the organizing value—efficiency—is not found in data, but 
 
 60.  See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/L64F-4WZM] (finding that 81% of Americans owned a smartphone, 
three quarters owned a laptop or a personal computer, and nearly half owned a tablet device, as of June 
2019).  
 61.  See id. (finding that 72% of Americans used at least one social media site, as of February 2019).  
 62.  See generally JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW 
DIGITAL SERFDOM 49–76 (2017) (describing the vast amount of data amassed each day by the so-called 
“Internet of Things”). 
 63.  See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A 
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 176–95 (2019). 
 64.  See ALPAYDIN, supra note 56, at 29–54.  
 65.  See Lin Chen et al., Projection-Free Online Optimization with Stochastic Gradient: From 
Convexity to Submodularity, 80 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 814, 814–15, http:// 
proceedings.mlr.press/v80/chen18c/chen18c.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF68-DHQT].   
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rather assumed by the system. If our goal is an efficient allocation of resources, 
and we possess all the data about the available means of production and 
individual preferences, techniques like machine learning enable us to arrive at the 
optimal allocation. Remember that, to a large degree, what we want to do is to 
simulate markets’ operation; or rather execute the same computation that the 
market executes, just in a less costly way.66 We can design the allocation-
algorithm. 
Third, the problem of computing power. The power of individual computers 
doubles every two years67 (anecdotally, each iPhone has a higher computing 
power than all the computers used by NASA to land on the Moon combined68), 
and their sheer quantity of computers is rising as well. Moreover, we no longer 
assume that it must be a single computer performing all the operations. In 2020, 
with technologies like cloud computing and network-computing, the division of 
labor between thousands of client- and server-devices is a reality. We can 
compute this equation. 
Fourth, the problem of fulfilling the plan. Let us assume that we know the 
optimal allocation of resources. How do we get from the plan to the actual 
allocation? First, the ability of individuals and organizations to communicate in 
real-time seems uncontroversial given the current state of technology. The 
problem of physical allocation remains. But here, too, technology is advancing. 
Soon, fleets of un-crewed vehicles like drones and self-driving cars might be able 
to transport people and goods around. Already in 2020, thanks to tracking 
devices in shipping companies’ cars, and apps like Uber or Lyft, more and more 
data about efficient ways to allocate transport-resources becomes available.69 We 
can realize the plan. 
All this suggests that, as a theoretical matter, more efficient economy-wide 
resource allocation can be possible when we rely on central planning rather than 
on markets and individuals contracting. 
If we can allocate resources more efficiently through a plan rather than using 
market mechanisms, why not consider doing so? This type of economic planning 
does not need to immediately replace all market structures. We could start with 
some sectors, where the efficiency gains could be the highest, or where the social 
costs of market operations seem the most undesirable. Arguably, in many 
sectors—like public healthcare, subsidized agriculture, and military spending—
the economic models already resemble command and control much more than 
 
 66.  See The Computer and the Market, supra note 5, at 158. 
 67.  According to “Moore’s law.” Whether “doubling” is factually correct remains disputable, but 
without a doubt, the computing power of individual devices, as well as the overall computing power of 
all existing computers combined, is growing at an impressive rate.  
 68.  See Tibi Puiu, Your Smartphone is Millions of Times more Powerful than All of NASA’s 
Combined Computing in 1969, ZME SCI. (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.zmescience.com/research/ 
technology/smartphone-power-compared-to-apollo-432/ [https://perma.cc/ZN4P-LUG]. 
 69.  See PHILLIPS & ROZWORSKI, supra note 36, at 76–99 (showing how the experience and data 
collected by large scale logistics operations of huge market chains might be the ingredient that the 
socialist planners missed).  
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actual markets. Moreover, organizations already increase their ability to operate 
based on data, and continuously collect feedback.70 These characteristics would 
facilitate a smoother transition to a planned economy. 
One should remember that this type of economic planning does not need to 
be conducted by the state; nor does it need to be conducted “centrally,” if by 
“centrally” we understand this to mean that one entity makes all the decisions. 
The power to command and control could reside in private entities or a network 
of public bodies and private organizations. Further, under certain conditions, 
political decisions about allocation would take place only at the stage of designing 
or re-assessing the algorithmic allocation system which, once operational, would 
make decisions autonomously based on the data inputs. 
B. If We Are So Close, Why Are We Not There? 
One could object at this point by stating that the world sketched above is a 
piece of science fiction, so detached from reality, that any serious engagement 
with it is unwarranted. But this technology already exists. So why do we still live 
in a market economy? 
First, the technology that would enable a planned economy is relatively new. 
And yet, the impact it has had in less than one generation is incredible. Google 
was launched in 1998,71 Facebook in 2004,72 the first iPhone sold in 2007,73 and 
the first Uber ride took place in 2010.74 In the meantime, reliance on these apps 
and services has increased exponentially, while the ability of these companies to 
aggregate “knowledge of time and space” and compute big data is constantly 
rising. When speaking of data companies and the planned economy, we are 
clearly too early into the process to claim that anything is impossible. 
Second, and profoundly, merely thirty years have passed since the West 
defeated the Soviet Union and its satellites in the Cold War. “Planned economy,” 
especially in Eastern Europe, remains synonymous with poverty and 
authoritarianism—no one wants that, and so no one is trying to achieve it.75 At 
least not under that label. 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  From the Garage to the Googleplex, GOOGLE, https://about.google/intl/en_us/our-story/ 
[https://perma.cc/4HA9-L6QZ].  
 72.  Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, GUARDIAN (Jul. 25, 2007), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia [https://perma.cc/5XEL-C7JZ].  
 73.  iPhone Premieres This Friday Night at Apple Retail Stores, APPLE (June 28, 2007), 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2007/06/28iPhone-Premieres-This-Friday-Night-at-Apple-Retail-
Stores [https://perma.cc/74BN-2DQ9].  
 74.  The History of Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/history// [https://perma.cc/FEC8-
S9ZX ]. 
 75.  Anecdotally, Phillips and Rozworski open THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF WALMART with a 
several-page-long apology for writing about Walmart in any other tone than unilaterally critical 
(expressing admiration for its logistic abilities). See PHILLIPS & ROZWORSKI, supra note 36, at 16–19. 
Conversely, whenever discussing this project with my friends and colleagues in (post-socialist) Poland, I 
find myself compelled to offer an apology for writing about a planned economy in a tone other than 
clearly negative.  
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Third, I am not claiming to prove that a centrally planned economy might 
achieve higher levels of efficiency than the market. However, I do believe that all 
the consideration up to this point warrants treating such a possibility not only as 
an interesting thought experiment, but also as a variation of a problem that, as a 
society, we might potentially face. Why would this be a problem? Apart from 
efficiency, there is one other reason to prefer individual property, contract, and 
markets over planning. Freedom. 
 
IV 
LIVING A CENTRALLY PLANNED LIFE 
One could try to imagine a planned economy from the perspective of society 
or the perspective of an individual. In the following Part, I do the latter and sketch 
a picture of a person living a centrally planned life. The story has a dual purpose: 
to illustrate how such a world could look, and to prepare the foundation to 
analyze the interplay between the human condition and the tension between 
choosing and having things planned for oneself. 
A. A Thought Experiment 
Imagine you wake up to an alarm-clock tune that makes you happy and at the 
time that renders you refreshed and well-rested. You picked neither the tune nor 
the hour; an algorithm did, based on data about you and millions of others. You 
take a shower and put on comfortable and good-looking clothes. You are not sure 
how they got into the wardrobe, and at this point you no longer care. In the 
kitchen, a pre-cooked, drone-delivered breakfast waits for you. Exactly what you 
feel like eating. Your smart device tells you when the electric car will pick you 
up, and what work you will perform today. In the workplace, you feel challenged, 
but not exhausted. Lunch is great; you eat what you like with the people you find 
amusing. At the end of the day you go on a date with a person that you have 
never met. You go to see an interesting movie, then enjoy a delicious dinner, 
none of which you chose. Why do you and your date have so much in common? 
Why is this such a perfect match? These questions do not cross your mind 
anymore. Most of the time, it is a perfect match. 
Every now and then there are glitches, of course. That is why you are asked 
to rate as many experiences as possible and to provide feedback along various 
dimensions. This feedback is taken into account. Too much salmon? The next 
day you dine on beef. Feel like listening to music instead of watching movies? 
There are live concerts. No longer enjoy the job you are doing this month? There 
are plenty of other things you can do. Feeling creative? Today you will be 
innovating. Too tired of thinking? Sure, oversee this production line. 
You can express discontent as much as you like; we will make sure your life 
improves. You get what you want. To a degree. Sometimes, you get things you 
never even knew you would enjoy. There are, of course, things you cannot do. 
You cannot take two weeks off and fly to the tropics more often than once every 
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few years. Then again, no one you know can do that. And from what you learn 
about history, most people could have never done that before, either. 
Still, sometimes, you are given a choice. Tell us, what would you like to eat 
today? How would you go about solving this problem? What movie to see? 
Whom to meet? You enjoy choosing, but only for a while. It turns out that choice 
is tiring, and the outcomes are always less satisfying than when you simply rely 
on the planner. At some point, you stop taking the risk. 
Who makes all these plans? Who is “we”? From the phenomenological 
perspective, this is of secondary significance. What matters is that this does not 
have to be the government. This coordination could be conducted by a private 
firm, or a network of private firms, or a mix of both private and public entities.76 
Moreover, the granularity of decisions undertaken by the planner can also range 
from micro-management on the human level to general goal specification, further 
realized by the machines. 
B. The Choices We Make About Making Choices 
Libraries are full of life-descriptions written by the people who lived under 
communist dictatorships. Accounts of fear, food shortage, and general misery 
have been given by many inhabitants of the Second World in the twentieth 
century.77 From this Article’s perspective, those accounts do not present 
philosophical problems. Without question, these circumstances were terrible, 
morally flawed, and should be unequivocally condemned and warned against. 
However, when one imagines a pleasant and satisfying life in a planned society, 
the moral significance of the trade-off between efficiency and freedom becomes 
salient. Do you prefer choosing everything in your life and more suffering; or 
choosing less in favor of a more convenient existence? Does your answer change 
depending on whether you struggle to pay the rent or struggle to choose what 
academic paper to write next? If you could vote for one or another, what would 
you vote for? 
Clearly, individual preferences will differ, and there is no right or wrong 
answer. In this regard, people are different. Some people like more choices, some 
like less. Some like shopping, some do not. Some enjoy browsing catalogues for 
hours, some find it extremely tiring. There are people who detest having a boss, 
and some who are terrified with the idea of having to decide everything 
themselves. Similarly, there will be people who like the choices and risks 
 
 76.  Note that, once you give up the right to choose, it becomes less relevant whether you did so 
through a market transaction with a profit-driven entity, or through a civic action with the government 
assuming power. It could matter regarding the types of constraints put on the planner (contractual versus 
constitutional), but in the analyzed hypothetical scenario, we assume that people are fine with the 
delegation and its outcomes. 
 77.  See, e.g., ELENA GOROKHOVA, A MOUNTAIN OF CRUMBS: A MEMOIR (2011) (describing the 
daily life of a young woman in the Soviet Union in the 1960s).  
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associated with markets, and people who will like the idea of freeing themselves 
of these choices.78 
However, as a society, through our laws and political decisions, we do make 
choices about the overall answer to this question. The current debate about the 
future of the American healthcare system is one example. Is there value in people 
choosing their plans, even if some will choose to hurt themselves, and some will 
remain uninsured? Perhaps our society would be better off if there was less 
choice, but everyone’s health expenses were covered. Food regulation is another 
example. Should people be free to eat unhealthily and buy cheap and tasty 
products, even if their health will deteriorate and place burdens on others? Or 
will we outlaw certain choices? Those are all public law examples. But markets 
in 2020 provide examples as well. 
Arguably, our everyday life features more planning than we realize. 
Personalized ads and recommendations are one example. When searching for an 
iron or blender on Amazon, the user will see “Amazon’s choice.” This choice 
results from feedback provided by other users, and what Amazon knows about 
the individual shopper. Clearly, an individual can choose something else. But will 
they? Similarly, vacation advertisements are fine-tuned based on individual 
preferences and the availability of transport and lodging. Another example is the 
omnipresence of boilerplate contracts, whereby consumers essentially never 
bargain for the terms of contract or specifications of products and services 
purchased. Moreover, we witness a gradual move from the ownership model of 
music, videos, and cars, towards a subscription model of Spotify, Netflix, ZipCar, 
and Uber.79 Is it better to invest upfront and own all the consequences, or to pay 
a small fee regularly, and only use when needed? Is it better to read reviews and 
compare product specifications, or to rely on the algorithmic suggestion? Again, 
individuals’ choices and preferences will differ in this regard. However, their 
actions and professed goals might not always perfectly align (as I explore in the 
next Part). 
Imagining a planned economy takes these questions a step qualitatively 
further. Instead of fine-tuning the choice architecture in which individuals still 
make decisions,80 we take the choice away and outsource it to the planner. 
C. The Human Condition and the Planning Crawling Upon Us 
The question troubling me is: as a society, will we actually get to choose 
between efficiency and convenience on the one hand, and freedom and autonomy 
on the other? If we transition to a world other than that of liberal democracy, 
 
 78.  This point has been made to me in conversation by the Honerable Guido Calabresi. For his 
discussion of the interplay between law, economics, tastes, and values, see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, 
THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 131–72 (2016). 
 79.  See AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL 
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 169–73 (2016) (“A future that deemphasizes ownership is not 
only inevitable, it’s already here.”).  
 80.  See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 252 (2008). 
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though a world of material and sensational abundance, will this happen because 
as a society we decide to do so? Or will it happen without anyone’s conscious 
choice about the structure, unnoticed, step-by-step? 
This question should be taken up consciously, by a polity. Yet, I fear that it 
will not. Planned economic order could become reality not only as a result of 
political decisions, but also could slowly crawl upon us in a world governed by 
the alliance of nation-states and big tech multinationals. Having our lives 
algorithmically planned for us could, at some point, lead to more efficiency, more 
wealth, more convenience, and more pleasure, at the cost of personal liberty. This 
would be in line with the changing nature of the twenty-first centuries’ 
authoritarianisms, which do not oppose consumerism or personal wealth, but 
rather lure people with those things exactly.81 In this picture, individuals do not 
have liberty taken away from them; rather bit by bit, they give it up in exchange 
for easy and pleasant lives. Not at once, maybe not even within one generation, 
but they do. What would this look like? 
Two distinctions might be helpful at this point: between a marginal cost of 
every decision seen against the overall structural change, and between short- and 
long-term preferences of individuals (or maybe better—impulsive decisions seen 
against the individuals’ professed goals). Let us take a brief look at both. 
First, it is possible that every single choice one makes is, in itself, rational, 
while the sum of all choices turns out to be, in hindsight, very costly and therefore 
ultimately irrational. Guido Calabresi told me the story of how a century ago, 
New Haven, Connecticut had the second-highest concentration of houses dating 
back to the eighteenth-century in the United States.82 Today, three are left. None 
of these houses were individually worth keeping. But dozens of rational 
demolitions led to doing away with something grander that people did not realize 
was valuable. Similarly, it might be rational to outsource decisions about dietary 
choices, clothing, entertainment, or employment to the planner. It might make 
sense, for every single individual delegation, to free oneself from having to deal 
with some costly decision-making process. And yet, all these delegations might 
lead to losing something grander—personal liberty. 
Second, it might be even simpler than that. As developments in behavioral 
and cognitive sciences prove over and over again, individuals seldom act fully in 
accord with their professed goals.83 To appreciate this point, consider an 
individual on a diet, making a decision about whether to eat a chocolate cake or 
not. He might see the negative effects of eating the cake, seen against the goal of 
losing weight, already at the moment of the decision. But in this very moment, 
 
 81.  China is an extreme example of this trend, where the growing middle class has been allowed to 
get richer and enjoy their lives more, at the cost of not challenging the political decisions by the 
Communist Party. See David Goodman, Why China’s Middle Class Supports the Communist Party, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-chinas-middle-class-
s_b_4143250 [https:// perma.cc/NR4F-9ZCV].  
 82.  Interview with Hon. Guido Calabresi, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in New Haven, Conn. (Dec. 5, 2019).  
 83.  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 109–98 (2011).  
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being tired, and stressed, and hungry, and unhappy, the chocolate cake has all the 
appeal in the world. Similarly, even seeing the negative long-term consequences 
of giving up on singular liberties, we might—in the moment of doing so—find 
small transitions from market to planning too appealing to give up on. 
There exists a certain version of planned economy which necessarily leads to 
authoritarianism. However, not because it will fail, but because it will succeed. 
This success will come with many rewards for the individual, but cannot be 
logically reconciled with certain types of freedoms and life choices. 
The temptation to give up freedom exists. The prospect of releasing oneself 
from the ability, but also from the necessity, to make choices and to assume 
responsibility for them seems attractive to some, if not to many. It might not be 
appealing to you. It might flatly terrify you. Or, you might despise the idea of 
someone else making such a choice. However, are you certain that all our fellow 
humans share this opposition? 
If people are forced to give up freedom together with wealth, opportunities, 
and pleasures, they will fight back. But if people are offered a choice to have less 
stressful, more convenient, and more pleasant lives—in exchange for losing some 
liberties—they might be willing to pay that cost. In the end, many individuals 
could actually be happy in such a world. Unless we believe that a precondition of 
actual happiness is having an ability to choose, including a right to be wrong and 
a duty to suffer the consequences of being wrong; unless we believe this is 
necessary, people could lead happy lives in a planned society, without property, 
contracts, or markets. 
This account raises two questions: what do I mean by happy and what do I 
mean by authoritarianism? In the end, is merely having one’s needs satisfied 
enough to be happy? Or, conversely, if the outcomes delivered by the planner 
align to the highest possible degree with the preferences of an individual, that is, 
the planned choices mirror the choices the individual would have taken in the 
world of perfect competition,84 how is that authoritarian? 
One can tell a positive and a negative story in response. The positive story 
would stipulate a world in which individuals delegate freedoms regarding the 
basic needs to the planner, in order to achieve a space and time for the pursuit of 
the highest modes of fulfillment—quality time with family, intellectual 
discussions, religious engagement, creation and admiration of art, and so forth. 
 
 84.  Note that, under a certain set of assumptions—in which perfect information about available 
means of production and individual needs and preferences exists, and assuming that preferences are 
independent of the mode of information conferring—the outcome of the market process and of central 
planning would, in theory and on paper, be exactly the same. In this sense, the question on whether to 
prefer markets to planning depends on their relative efficiency and on the alternative costs. For the 
argument that advancements in data processing technologies could make markets more efficient, see 
generally ERIC POSNER & GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY (2018); Rory van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 
815 (2019). For a critical comment on Posner and Weyl’s account towards, among other things, a centrally 
planned economy, see generally Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and the Just Society, 
117 MICH. L. REV. 1289 (2019).  
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The mental and physical faculties currently overtaken by chores, shopping, 
planning, and overtime-working would be freed. The negative story would, in 
turn, imagine individuals so deeply immersed in physical sensations, so distracted 
with the constant, fresh inflow of stimuli causing their brains to release dopamine, 
that they will never find time necessary to reflect on the lack of liberty in their 
lives. In order to see that one needs time for reflection to be happy one needs to 
have time for reflection in the first place. 
Authoritarianism, in my view, has to do with the space individuals have for 
shaping their preferences themselves. One could imagine feeling happy in the 
world where one’s needs are satisfied, especially if the planner is also in charge 
of the needs-creation. Just as in Huxley’s Brave New World, we could become 
people conditioned to like what we get.85 Arguably, we already are conditioned 
for that along many dimensions, ranging from school curricula to omnipresent 
ads. However, in today’s world, the choice is still normatively ours. Although we 
might be sliding into one where it no longer is. 
Whether this slide into algorithmic authoritarianism should be allowed to 
happen is a normative question. I do not argue that such a world is, in principle, 
immoral. I think it is, but I accept that others might not share my assessment. 
However, if this happens, this should not happen by accident, as a result of a 
thousand micro-choices, without the big picture and the long-run in mind. 
Rather, our society must consciously create the conditions which allow this to 
happen. This is where one should ponder what roles are played (and are not 
played) by the law. 
 
V 
ROLES (TO BE) PLAYED BY THE LAW 
A. Institutions, Incentives, and Ideas 
The most fundamental claim of Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation is that 
markets are neither natural nor necessary, and do not arise by themselves.86 
Every community, in his view, has an economy. Not every polity has a market. 
For markets to emerge, certain legal institutions must be in place. According to 
Polanyi, this emergence occurrs when three “fictitious commodities”—labor, 
land, and money—are created by law.87 Legal institutions facilitating trade in land 
and labor, together with the universal role played by money as a means of storing 
value and facilitating exchanges, are useful fictions that enabled market-based, 
capitalist economies to grow. 
If the law provided the institutions for the emergence of the market economy, 
it has been ideology and material conditions that led people to make use of them 
in the particular way. Max Weber argues that a fundamental shift in people’s way 
 
 85.  See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). 
 86.  See generally POLANYI, supra note 6.  
 87.  See generally id.  
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of thinking about a good life needed to occur for capitalism to emerge.88 Instead 
of wanting to preserve their way of life, people needed the urge to accumulate 
resources for accumulation’s sake. New industrialists, taking risks to create more 
wealth than they could ever possibly consume, needed to believe that such an 
activity is both morally acceptable and, for some reason, desirable. 
The role played by private law is therefore chiefly that of enabling certain 
social practices, rather than directly allowing or prohibiting, or serving as an 
instrument for dispute resolution. However, this legal move created the 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the transformation into capitalism. 
What was missing was the ideological fuel. 
Why does this matter for the question of algorithmic central planning? Two 
reasons stand out: the law is a source of incentives, and law creates institutions. 
Regarding the latter, the law might be a source of an ideology, or might be 
normalizing new ways of thinking,89 but the changed societal worldview might, 
and most probably will, come from other places as well. 
Incentives to collect information, cut costs of marketing and production, and 
optimize processes are inherent in capitalism. The better a firm understands the 
market, consumers’ needs, and competitors’ strategies, the higher the chance that 
firm will make a profit. However, the very existence of this paradigm is 
predicated on the assumption that—as a society—we are better off with this 
model of economic activity. In a world in which the goal is efficiency, the market 
is the first choice only as long as it delivers more efficient outcomes. 
Regarding institutions, one should focus not only on those explicitly created 
by private law but also those which emerged as part of the social practice in the 
void created by the law’s inaction. 
Consider the right to collect, analyze, and use personal data by online service 
providers. This data is the source of the potential future planner’s knowledge 
about individual needs and preferences, as well as available means of production 
and circumstances of time and space. But, it is by no means natural or necessary 
that companies should be allowed to gather and use all the data about people 
they can find. Julie Cohen calls this situation a “biopolitical public domain,” 
where whoever manages to capture information about people’s lives and 
experiences is free to use it.90 In her view, the lack of legal fictions plays a similar 
role to the creation of the Polanyian fictitious commodities.91 As a result, as 
another great book recently put it, we already live in a “surveillance capitalism,” 
where human experience can be traded and “behavioral futures”—that is, 
 
 88.  See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott 
Parsons trans., 1905) (suggesting that propagation of the Protestant Ethic ideology—which valued the 
accumulation of resources—enabled modern capitalism to develop and flourish).  
 89.  See CALABRESI, supra note 78, at 157–72. 
 90.  See JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 73 (2019). 
 91.  See id. at 15–47.  
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promises of human behavior to come—become a collateral bought and sold.92 All 
this is possible because data can be captured, analyzed, and traded. And in many 
ways, this leads to more efficient outcomes. Intuitively, the more we know about 
what people want, the better we can match their needs. We want to match their 
needs perfectly. Hence, there is an incentive to know as much as possible. And 
the law, by failing to identify data as a legally-recognized resource, paves the way. 
In addition, the law does little to prevent corporations from shaping the 
preferences of individuals. One of the surprising absentees in the theoretical 
stable of law and economics is the practice of advertising. We seem to assume 
that what ads do is, exclusively, to spread information. We police deceptive or 
misleading ads. In other words, as long as information in ads is not false, there is 
no claim against the advertiser. However, both the theory of marketing and the 
amount of money spent on it suggests that more is at play. Ads do not just provide 
information, they also shape preferences and incentives. In a world where 
companies are fully free to do so, algorithmic planning (replacing the markets 
both in the role of shaping preferences and providing supply) is a looming 
possibility.93 
However, just as capitalism was constructed both by legal institutions 
(commodification of land, labor, and money) and by the shifts in ideology 
(credited, by Weber, to the theology and practice of certain protestant 
denominations94), the algorithmically planned economy will emerge within 
legally enabled frames, but following people’s shared ideas of what constitutes a 
good life. 
What are these ideas and where do they come from? Without claiming to 
know the answer, I am quite certain that the cult of efficiency is one of them. As 
of today, this paradigm coexists with the cult of productivity and finding pride in 
being busy;95 but this does not have to remain this way. For, simultaneously, we 
observe the growing importance of entertainment in people’s lives. Whether 
distractive practices like social media, binge-watching Netflix, or the 
popularization of news delivery and mass culture are responses to people’s actual 
needs, or business models of addiction, the trend of wanting to be entertained 
continues. Finally, perpetually busy and distracted individuals value convenience 
to a growing degree, exemplified by one-day Amazon delivery, the booming of 
food delivery services like Grubhub or Deliveroo, or growing amount of services 
one can receive right at one’s phone. 
With all this in mind, one can wonder how far we are from the world in which 
individuals themselves will no longer choose and make contracts in a 
marketplace. Where individual choice is no longer the paradigm. 
 
 92.  ZUBOFF, supra note 63, at 7–8.  
 93.  For a critical take on this state of affairs, and an analysis from the consumer and antitrust law 
perspective, see generally Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age, 
127 YALE L.J. 2270 (2018).  
 94.  See generally WEBER, supra note 88. 
 95.  See MARKOVITS, supra note 49, at 82–88. 
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I think we are closer to that point than we would like to believe. 
B. What Could the Law Do? 
What could the law do? Note that I do not claim that the world of the 
algorithmically planned economy is necessarily morally flawed and must be 
prevented. What I do claim is that we should not end up living in this world by 
accident. A conscious social decision should be made. As of today, it seems to 
me, the conditions precedent for the unconscious move to materialize are 
present. How can the law enable us to make such a decision democratically? 
First, we need to shed light on the data-driven practices of personalized 
experience. As of today, we understand very little about how the chipping-off of 
our personal choices actually works. The privacy policies of online companies do 
not contain enough information to make sense out of their practices.96 We need 
better information about the steps taken towards algorithmic central planning. 
Once we have a better understanding of the preference-shaping activities of 
corporations, we might be able to see clearly where steps need to be taken to 
increase private autonomy and where its preservation in the long run might 
require public-law interventions.97 
Second, we need to address an “elephant in the room” of private law: the 
question of the border between information-conferring and behavior-
manipulation in advertisements. As of today, the threshold for ads’ legality is very 
low—as long as the information contained is not false, the ads are in principle 
legal. However, these laws have been written for a world without immediate 
transactions and without advertisers’ ability to continuously collect feedback on 
each communication’s efficacy. Whether the corporate ability to shape consumer 
preferences and to essentially create demand should be limited is a question that 
should be reclaimed by political discourse. 
Third, if we do want to prevent (or slow down) the emergence of an 
algorithmically planned economy, we should ponder various ways of inserting 
friction into the system. This friction might come from: more stringent regulation 
of data collection and usage; actively employing antitrust law to promote 
competition; or simply outlawing certain marketing strategies. In doing so, 
however, we should be mindful of the regulatory goal—some moves might buy 
us time without changing the overall course of the society. 
Nevertheless, the law can only provide frames for what will be filled by human 
nature and culture. The creation of fictitious commodities was a necessary, but 
not sufficient, step in the emergence of capitalism;98 certain ideas and material 
 
 96.  See Marcus Moretti & Michael Naughton, Why Privacy Policies Are So Inscrutable, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/why-privacy-policies-are-so-
inscrutable/379615/ [https://perma.cc/6AP2-PLDK] (“Today’s privacy policies don’t tell consumers the 
whole story.”).  
 97.  See Przemysław Pałka, Data Management Law for the 2020s: The Lost Origins and the New 
Needs, 68 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 98.  See generally POLANYI, supra note 6. 
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conditions needed to occur. Similarly, for the choice between efficiency and 
freedom to be taken by society, a sufficiently large number of people sharing 
ideas necessary to make it must materialize. This role can be played by 
philosophy, art, religion, and even politics. What I want to do here is ring the bell. 




In this Article, I have argued that an economic order based on planning might 
soon be possible and might achieve higher levels of efficiency than an economy 
relying on private property, contracts, and market exchange. Such a possibility 
stems from socio-technological changes in our everyday practices, triggered by 
ubiquitous computing and advancements in data analytics techniques like 
machine learning. As a result, three issues become pertinent. 
First, when pondering economic and social reform, progressive thinkers 
should put the idea of a planned economy back on the table. The market 
paradigm is not the only possible economic order. Algorithmic planning does not 
have to be conducted entirely by the government, and not necessarily by a single 
entity. The commands could also be given by a network of public bodies and 
private firms. Moreover, planning does not have to replace markets in all sectors 
of the economy. However, in the areas where we can achieve significant 
efficiency increases—like healthcare, agriculture, and transport—algorithmic 
economic planning should be considered a viable alternative to markets. 
Second, if an order based on planning could be more efficient than one based 
on markets, a new normative question comes to the fore: do we prefer liberal 
economic systems because they lead to more efficiency, or because they enhance 
individual autonomy? As of today, a tacit alliance of both approaches exists. 
However, taking a full-fledged pro-efficiency stance might slowly render markets 
and private law obsolete. If the reason for private property and contracts is 
efficiency, once it becomes more efficient to plan, no space for markets will 
remain. Working out the boundary conditions is a central task for normative 
theorists. 
Third, as a society, we might transition into a world of planning tacitly, step-
by-step, without ever making a conscious decision to do so. Such a transition 
would gradually happen because individuals would freely choose to give up 
elements of their autonomy in piecemeal fashion. The conditions for this 
transition are created both by the institutions and incentive structures present in 
the law, and by the commonly shared ideas about what constitutes a good life. A 
world of algorithmic central planning would not necessarily be immoral, but this 
choice is political and should be taken up consciously by the polity. Law provides 
the framework for such deliberations, but the fuel must come from other social 
sources. 
